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Abstract
A significant proportion of the trade basket of many developing countries is com-
prised of primary commodities. This implies relative price movements in com-
modities may have important consequences for economic growth and poverty
reduction. Taking a long-run perspective, we examine the historical relation be-
tween a new aggregate index of commodity prices, economic activity and interest
rates. Initial empirical tests show that commodity prices present a downward
trend with breaks over the entire industrial age, providing clear support for the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. It would also appear that this trend has declined
at a faster rate since the 1870s. Conversely, several GDP series such as World,
Chile, China, UK and US, trend upwards with breaks. Such trending behaviour
in both commodity prices and economic activity suggests a latent common factor
like technological innovation.
To assess the relationships between economic series, we apply a stationary
VAR (Vector Autoregression) to model movements around trends. Strikingly,
there is evidence that commodity prices Granger cause income and interest rates,
whilst interest rates Granger cause commodity prices. From these results and
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the related impulse response function analysis, the historical perspective pro-
vides some useful information for contemporary policy makers. For example,
loose monetary policy has tended to support higher commodity prices. More-
over, commodity price movements have an asymmetric country effect on economic
activity; periods of falling commodity prices will support GDP growth for com-
modity importers like the US but depress growth for commodity exporters such
as Chile.
Keywords: Primary commodities; Prebisch-Singer hypothesis; Economic growth;
Interest rates; Structural breaks; VAR.
JEL Classification: O13; C22.
1 Introduction
A significant proportion of national income for many developing countries is often
generated by a small number of primary commodities (see Harvey et al., 2010), leading
to a possible resource curse.1 The nature and causes of any long-run trends and short-
run movements in primary commodity prices therefore have significant implications for
growth and poverty reduction policies in developing countries.
Analysis of long-run commodity prices is dominated by the Prebisch-Singer (PS)
hypothesis which implies a secular, negative trend in commodity prices relative to
manufactures.2 Possible theoretical rationales include low income elasticities of de-
mand for commodities, asymmetric market structures that result from comparatively
homogeneous commodity producers generating highly competitive commodity markets
whilst facing oligopolistic manufacturing markets, and technological and productiv-
ity differentials between core (industrial) and periphery (non-industrial) countries. If
1For example, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators suggests that primary commodities
contributed 50% of the total merchandise exports of developing countries in 2007. Strikingly, reliance
on primary commodities is even higher in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Higher Indebted Poorer Coun-
tries, accounting for approximately 66% and 80% of merchandise exports respectively.
2See Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950).
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a country’s export commodities present long-run downward trends in their relative
prices, the policy advice is typically to diversify the export mix to include significant
proportions of manufactures and/or services. Additionally, as is noted in Arezki et al.
(2014a), understanding the trend and other time series characteristics should enable
improved forecasting of commodity price movements.
Empirical evidence examining the PS hypothesis provides an ambiguous picture.
The vast majority of recent studies employ the Grilli and Yang (1988) dataset of 24
annual non-fuel primary commodity prices which commences in 1900.3 However, the
relatively large variance of commodity prices (see Deaton, 1999) and the possibility
of trend structural breaks inhibits statistical determination of any trend magnitude
and direction with this sample size. A possible approach to address this issue is to
provide greater degrees of freedom via a backwards extension of the sample. Recently,
Harvey et al. (2010) and Arezki et al. (2014b) employ a unique disaggregated dataset,
comprised of 25 separate commodity time series and spanning the 17th to the 21st
centuries.
Compared to long-run trends, shorter term fluctuations in commodity prices are
relatively under-researched in the literature. This is surprising given that commodity
prices are known to be extremely volatile, leading to uncertainty over future revenue
and cost streams. This uncertainty may inhibit planning and deter investment by
all the relevant agents in the commodity supply chain (i.e., household farmers, coop-
eratives, larger commercial farmers and governments). The shortfalls in investment
subsequently act as a drag on future growth and poverty reduction prospects (see
Blattman et al., 2007 and Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2009). Additionally, although
severe price movements may be temporary in character, permanent and detrimental
effects on physical and cognitive development, particularly during early childhood, can
arise in commodity dependent communities (see, inter alia, Pongou et al., 2006 and
3Earlier work, not employing the GY dataset, includes Spraos (1980), Sapsford (1985) and Thirwall
and Bergevin (1985).
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Miller and Urdinola, 2010).
Some studies have attempted to identify the macroeconomic variables that influence
the behaviour of commodity prices around any long-run trend. Amongst others, the
structural approach of Gilbert (1989) and Chu and Morrison (1986) demonstrated that
two demand side variables, the US dollar real exchange rate and industrial production
of industrialised countries, adequately explained movements in commodity prices over
the early 1980s. After 1984, when industrial countries started to recover from reces-
sion, this demand-side framework failed to explain the continuing weakness in prices.
In response, Borensztein and Reinhart (1994) extended the traditional framework to
include supply side factors, the relative price of oil and a new definition of demand,
encompassing output changes from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The model
greatly improved empirical explanation of commodity price movements over the 1980s
and early 1990s. More recent work, such as Arango et al. (2012), stresses that economic
activity and interest rates are the primary determinants of commodity prices.
Papers attempting to explain movements in commodity prices typically use post
World War 2 data. For example, the aforementioned Arango et al. (2012), employs
annual data from 1960 to 2006. Our paper takes a different tack by examining rela-
tionships between commodity prices, economic activity and interest rates over the very
long-run. To do so, we first create an aggregate index for real commodity prices. This
is achieved by collecting a large historical dataset on the export values of 23 individual
commodities; not a straightforward task. These new data are then used as weights
when combined with updated individual commodity series from Harvey et al. (2010)
to construct the aggregate annual series beginning in 1650 and running continuously
until 2014. Additionally, data for interest rates are obtained from the Bank of England,
whilst historical GDP data (i.e., for the World and various individual countries) are
obtained from the Maddison Project.
As a precursor to the multivariate approach, our second contribution is to examine
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the time series properties, and in particular the trend, of the long-run series. Given
the well known problems of identifying the order of integration of commodity price
or GDP series, and the pervasive influence of any unit root/stationarity pre-tests on
subsequent tests of commodity time series characteristics (see Harvey et al., 2010), we
apply trend tests and multiple trend break tests which are robust to whether or not the
series under consideration contains a unit root. The results show that the trend path
of our new aggregate commodity series can be split into four regimes (i.e., 1650 to the
early 1820s, the early 1820s to the early 1870s, the early 1870s to the mid-1940s, and
the mid-1940s to 2014). Through all but the second regime, a long-run downward trend
can be clearly detected, giving new historical support to the PS hypothesis. Moreover,
although prices present a secular decline over the 17th and 18th centuries, this was at
a slower rate as compared with the 20th century. The economic forces behind the PS
hypothesis would appear to have intensified during the 1900s.
In terms of economic activity, it is shown that UK GDP presents an upward trend
break in the 1820s and World GDP in the 1870s and 1950s. Interestingly, these dates are
closely associated with those found for commodity prices. Additionally, the increasing
rate of trend growth in GDP as the sample increases, mirrors the decreasing rate
of trend growth for commodity prices, suggesting a common latent factor such as
technological innovation.
Our third contribution is to model the relationships between our long-run series.
The data are first demeaned and detrended according to the breaks found in the prior
time series analysis. These detrended series are shown to be stationary and therefore,
unlike other recent literature which does not allow for breaks, a cointegration approach
is not appropriate. Using a stationary VAR (Vector Autoregression), there is evidence
that (detrended) commodity prices Granger cause (detrended) GDP and interest rates,
whilst interest rates Granger cause commodity prices. Such results have implications
for the resource curse and the effect of monetary policy.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the theory
and empirical methodology, whilst section 3 describes the new data. The empirical
results and associated discussion are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and Empirical Methodology
2.1 Demand and supply in the commodity market
The theory of either long-run trend or cyclical movements about the trend are not well
developed or evidenced (see Deaton and Laroque, 2003). As noted in the introduction,
rationales for the trend include low income elasticities of demand for commodities,
technological and productivity differentials or asymmetric market structures between
the oligopolistic, manufacturing core and the competitive, commodity producing south.
Additionally, new discoveries of commodities and technological innovation4 in commod-
ity production will increase supply and reduce costs respectively, also placing downward
pressure on the trend in commodity prices. Movements around any trend, and includ-
ing macroeconomic variables mentioned by the literature such as economic activity
(see Borenszstein and Reinhart, 1994) and interest rates (see Frankel, 2006), might
be described by the following partial equilibrium model. Using a standard log-linear
demand function (see Deaton and Laroque, 2003), it can be written that:
dt = αyt − βpt + γ + εdt (1)
where dt is demand, yt represents the logarithm of world income. and pt is the world
price for an internationally traded commodity. Moreover, a complimentary supply
function (see Arango et al., 2012) can be stated:
pt = δst−1 + ηrt−1 + θpt + εst (2)
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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where st is current supply as a function of last period’s supply and rt represents the
interest rate. In equilibrium, supply is equal to demand, and it can be shown that:
pt = (β + δ)
−1[αyt + γ − δst−1 + ηrt−1 + εdt − εst ] (3)
where (3) suggests that commodity prices around any trend are related to income,
interest rates and supply. Of course, before examining any multivariate association,
the time series properties of each individual series requires investigation. Given we will
employ very long-run data, breaks in the individual data generating processes (DGP)
are likely. Therefore, the following sections will outline our testing procedure for trends
and any breaks in trends and levels.
2.2 Testing for a linear trend
We initially consider the following DGP for zt, the logarithm of a variable of interest:
zt = α + βt+ ut, t = 1, ..., T (4)
ut = ρut−1 + εt, t = 2, ..., T (5)
with u1 = ε1, where εt is assumed to follow a stationary process. To permit the errors
ut to be either I(0) or I(1), we assume −1 < ρ ≤ 1, with the cases |ρ| < 1 and ρ = 1
corresponding to I(0) and I(1) errors, respectively. Given that we are interested in
examining issues like the PS hypothesis, the null hypothesis to be tested is H0 : β = 0,
and we wish to conduct tests on this hypothesis without assuming knowledge of whether
the errors ut are stationary or contain a unit root.
In the context of such a DGP, Perron and Yabu (2009a) propose tests of H0 : β = 0
that are robust to the order of integration properties of the underlying errors ut. We
denote the two alternative versions by tRQFβ (MU ) and t
RQF
β (UB); Perron and Yabu
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show that these statistics both follow an asymptotic standard normal distribution under
the null H0 : β = 0.
2.3 Testing for breaks in trend
The extant literature has shown that relative commodity prices may not be optimally
represented by a single, secular trend but by some segmented alternative (see, inter
alia, Ghoshray, 2011, and Kellard and Wohar, 2006). When assessing the evidence
for a broken trend, this literature has typically, as in the unbroken trend context,
relied on procedures that require pre-testing for a unit root. To circumvent the issues
surrounding the identification of the order of integration, and to examine directly
whether commodity prices contain a break in trend, Harvey et al. (2010) employ the
Harvey et al. (2009) test for a single break in trend, which does not assume any
a priori knowledge as to the order of integration of series. Analogously, Perron and
Yabu (2009b) provide a robust test for a single trend break that adopts the same broad
approach as the Perron and Yabu (2009a) test for a linear trend.
Of course, it is quite possible that our long historical time series contain more than
one structural break, thus we next consider testing for the presence of multiple breaks
in trend. We therefore augment the deterministic component of the DGP to allow
for, say, m breaks in level/trend, i.e. we consider replacing (4) with the following
specification:










j ) + ut, t = 1, ..., T (6)
where DUjt(T
B
j ) = 1(t > T
B
j ) and DTjt(T
B
j ) = 1(t > T
B
j )(t − TBj ), j = 1, ...,m, with
1(.) denoting the indicator function and TBj , j = 1, ...,m, denoting the break dates.
In this framework, Kejriwal and Perron (2010) propose a methodology for deter-
mining the number of breaks in trend, robust to the order of integration of the errors
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ut, based on a sequential application of the Perron and Yabu (2009b) procedure for de-
tecting a single break in trend. The first step is to apply the Perron and Yabu (2009b)
test directly to the series, testing the null of no breaks against the alternative of one
break in level/trend. Although the limit null distribution of their Exp-W test statistic
differs under I(0) and I(1) errors, Perron and Yabu (2009b) show that the critical values
are not dissimilar at typical levels of significance, and recommend using the maximum
of the I(0) and I(1) critical values to ensure the resulting test is conservative.5
If the null of zero breaks in level/trend is not rejected, the Kejriwal and Perron
procedure terminates. Otherwise, the next step is to condition on there being at least
one break (i.e., l = 1), and proceed to examine evidence for more than one break by
estimating the test statistic FT (l + 1 |l ) and comparing with critical values provided
by Kejriwal and Perron. Although in principle this sequential procedure can continue
until termination where no further breaks are detected, in practice Kejriwal and Perron
caution against allowing too many breaks in finite samples, given the potential for size
distortions and low power that can arise in the small sub-samples involved in the
procedure. In our application, we set the maximal number of breaks to be three.
3 Data
3.1 Commodity prices, historical exports and aggregation
The often employed Grilli-Yang dataset comprises twenty-four, internationally traded,
non-fuel commodities.6 Each annual nominal commodity price series (in US dollars)
is deflated by the United Nations Manufacturers Unit Value (MUV) index, the MUV
series reflecting the unit values of manufacturing exports from a number of industrial
5In this paper, pi, the trimming parameter, is set to 0.10 to exclude breaks at the very beginning
or end of the sample.
6The commodities are Aluminum, Banana, Beef, Cocoa, Coffee, Copper, Cotton, Hide, Jute, Lamb,
Lead, Maize, Palm Oil, Rice, Rubber, Silver, Sugar, Tea, Timber, Tin, Tobacco, Wheat, Wool and
Zinc.
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countries. Although a number of papers in the extant literature examine the twenty-
four commodities separately, many employ Grilli and Yang’s weighted aggregate real
index to summarise the behaviour of relative commodity prices as a whole.7
As noted in the introduction, the Grilli-Yang dataset begins in 1900, primarily
because this is the starting date for the MUV series; however, commodity and man-
ufacturing price data can be sampled backwards well before this time. Given the
extensive interest in modeling and analyzing the long-run trends of relative commodity
prices, it would appear important to utilize as much of the existing data as is sensibly
possible. To do this, Harvey et al. (2010) created a large and representative dataset of
twenty five relative commodity price series8 (nominal prices in British pound sterling9)
covering a 356 year period from 1650 to 2005.10 However, as a result of employing all
available data, the series are of unequal lengths. Specifically, twelve series begin in the
17th century (Beef, Coal, Cotton, Gold, Lamb, Lead, Rice, Silver, Sugar, Tea, Wheat
and Wool), three series begin in the 18th century (Coffee, Tobacco and Pig Iron), eight
series begin in the 19th century (Aluminum, Cocoa, Copper, Hide, Nickel, Oil, Tin
and Zinc) and two start from 1900 (Banana and Jute). Twenty of these commodities
are also found in the Grilli-Yang dataset and twenty three are non-fuel. Each nomi-
nal commodity price was deflated by a historical price index of manufactures (HPIM),
stretching back to 1650.11
Harvey et al. (2010) assess the properties of the twenty five ultra long commodity
prices separately. However, given the tendency in the literature to also examine ag-
gregate commodity series, it would appear useful to construct an ultra-long aggregate
series. Of course, this is not a trivial task, in particular because prices and weights se-
7The 1977-1979 values of world exports of each commodity are used as weights.
8See the appendix of Harvey et al. (2010) for a fuller description of the source of each price.
9British pound sterling is used because the US did not have its own currency before independence
in 1776.
10Although it is possible to get data for commodity prices from before 1650, we could find no reliable
source of manufacturing prices.
11For details on the construction of HPIM see Harvey et al. (2010).
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ries for all commodities are not available uniformly over the period 1650 to the present
day. Let the Composite Commodity Price Index (CCPI) be the weighted average of
twenty-three Harvey et al. (2010) commodities, where the weights reflect the impor-
tance of each commodity in total commodity trade.12
Finally, note that another comparator index was also created, a non-oil version of
the Commodity Composite Price Index (CCPI′). Figure 1 shows the logarithms of
CCPI and CCPI′, revealing a close similarity and apparent downward trend in both
series over the full sample period. CCPI and CCPI′ will be empirically examined
over the full sample; the unbroken trend analysis is applied to a sub-sample of these
series (1900-2008), allowing for a more direct comparison with an updated version of
the Grilli-Yang non-fuel weighted aggregate real index (GYCPI).13 Figure 2 plots the
logarithms of these indices over 1900 to 2008. Notably (and as might be expected),
the logarithms of CCPI, CCPI′ and GYCPI appear to move in a relatively consistent
manner over the course of the 20th century. Of course, differences will arise, even
between these similar series. For example, while CCPI and CCPI′ are constructed using
variable weights and the HPIM deflator, GYCPI uses constant weights from 1977-79
and the MUV deflator. In particular, Figure 3 illustrates how HPIM compares with
the MUV index for the period since 1900, over which the MUV index is available. In
absolute terms the difference is not large and thus is reflected in a very high correlation
coefficient of 0.993. However, and as can be observed in Figure 3, in relative terms there
are a few significant differences, most notably during the period 1914-1945, where the
MUV index is often 25% below our index. As noted by Harvey et al. (2010), this result
suggests that export unit values used to construct the MUV index are potentially biased
12In this paper, we employ an extended Harvey et al. (2010) commodity and manufacturing price
dataset that runs from 1650 to 2014. Additionally, we removed gold and silver from the original list of
twenty five commodities. There is no clear distinction between monetary gold/silver and commodity
gold/silver imports in the US Geological Survey data; this could create a distortion, as, for example,
monetary gold and silver were heavily imported during the two world war eras.
13The authors thank Stephan Pfaffenzeller for providing the extended GYCPI series from 1900 to
2008.
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measures of price movements, particularly when long data series are considered.14
3.2 Other historical macroeconomic data
In section 2, it was suggested that macroeconomic variables related to commodity prices
include income, interest rates and supply. Although annual data on quantities traded
for many commodities is only available post-World War 2, longer-run series are available
for income and interest rates. For example, in terms of income, we initially source our
income data, similarly to Erten and Ocampo (2013), from Angus Maddison’s data,
updated recently by the Maddison Project.15 From here we obtain (i) World GDP16
for 1820-2009 (ii) USA GDP from 1820-2009 (iii) Chile GDP from 1870-2009 and (iv)
China from 1950-2009. Of course, the UK became the world’s pre-eminent economy
over the course of the 17th to 19th century and by the early 1800s had the highest per
capita income in the world (see Bolt and Van Zenden, 2013). However, Maddison’s
annual data for UK GDP only goes back to 1800. Recently, Broadberry et al. (2011)
produced a real output series for the UK from 1270 to 1870, and we use these data
from 1650.
Finally, sources of historical interest rate data are more difficult to obtain but the
Bank of England (see Hills et al., 2010) have recently made available annual data on
long-term UK government bonds from 1703 and this is used in our later analysis.
14Harvey et al. (2010) suggest the value added price deflator used by HPIM has three advantages
over export unit values: first, it omits the influence of intermediate products; second, it allows for
compositional changes; and third, technological progress is, to some extent, reflected in the deflator.
15See http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm
16Analogously to Erten and Ocampo (2013) we use the annual GDP series for the World with
complete data from 1950 onwards and discrete values for 1820, 1870, 1913 and 1940. The missing
values are interpolated using data for 16 OECD countries from 1870, and the 7 available OECD
countries from 1820.
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4 Empirical results and discussion
4.1 Commodity price trend function analysis
Table 1 shows the results of applying the order of integration robust trend test tRQFβ (MU )
presented in section 4.1 to the new relative commodity price indices outlined in section
3.17 The table also reports estimated growth rates and confidence intervals based on the
quasi-feasible GLS (Generalized Least Squares) approach of Perron and Yabu (2009a).
Notably, for both new series CCPI and CCPI′ over the full sample, the null of no trend
is rejected in favour of the alternative of a negative trend at the 1% significance level.
This is a striking result, particularly when considering the sample length of the new
commodity indices. The two series, commencing in 1650, have declined subsequently
at an annual average rate of just below 0.9%.
On the other hand, although the three sub-sample series also display negative
growth rates, only the test statistic for the GYCPI series is large enough to reject
the null from 1900 onwards. The inability of the CCPI and CCPI′ series to generate
rejections of the null of no trend is perhaps reflective of their relatively larger variance
over the course of the 20th century, compared with the GYCPI data. Note that testing
against a two-sided alternative (allowing for the possibility of positive trends) does not
lead to any further rejections of the no trend null.
Focusing now on the two ultra-long series (CCPI and CCPI′), it is important to
next consider the possibility that one or more structural breaks have occurred in the
deterministic trend function, as discussed in section 2.3. Table 2 reports results for
the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) sequential order of integration robust procedure for
detecting the number of breaks in level/trend, up to the maximum number permitted
of three. For each step of the sequential procedure, the table reports results for the
FT (l+1 |l ) test, and, if a rejection is obtained in favour of l+1 break(s), the estimated
17The tRQFβ (UB) test gives analogous results and is therefore not reported. Additionally, the zλ
test of Harvey et al. (2007) also gives similar results that are available on request from the authors.
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break date(s) obtained at each stage are also reported. The end result of the procedure
is a finding of evidence (at the 1% significance level) in favour of three breaks in
level/trend for both CCPI and CCPI′. The breaks occur at the dates 1820, 1872/3 and
1946, with the corresponding fitted values at these minimum global SSR dates, i.e. the
fitted values from (6), given by:
CCPI: pt = 2.88− 0.0079t
+ 0.34DU1t(1820) + 0.0031DT1t(1820)
− 0.37DU2t(1872)− 0.0087DT2t(1872)
+ 0.48DU3t(1946)− 0.0003DT3t(1946) + uˆt
CCPI′: pt = 2.88− 0.0079t
+ 0.34DU1t(1820) + 0.0032DT1t(1820)
− 0.39DU2t(1873)− 0.0080DT2t(1873)
+ 0.69DU3t(1946)− 0.0015DT3t(1946) + uˆt
Graphical representations of these results are given in Figures 4 and 5.
The two commodity price indices can therefore be approximately split into four
intertemporal regimes: 1650 to the early 1820s; the early 1820s to the early 1870s;
the early 1870s to the mid-1940s; and the mid-1940s to the present day. To ascertain
whether the trends in each of these four regimes are significantly negative, we wish to
test the following hypotheses (based on the model (6)): H0 : β = 0 for the first regime
(1650-1820), H0 : β+γ1 = 0 for the second regime (1821-1872/3), H0 : β+γ1+γ2 = 0 for
the third regime (1873/4-1946), and H0 : β+γ1+γ2+γ3 = 0 for the fourth regime (1947-
2010), in each case against a one sided (lower tailed) alternative. In order to conduct
tests of these hypotheses that are again robust to the order of integration of the errors,
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we consider a quasi-feasible GLS-based testing approach consistent with the Perron
and Yabu (2009b) approach for testing for a break. The resulting autocorrelation-
corrected t-statistics are then formed in an analogous way to W RQF (T
B
1 ) of Perron
and Yabu (2009b), and, conditional on the break dates, follow asymptotic standard
normal distributions under the respective null hypotheses. Table 3 reports the results,
and we find strong evidence in favour of a declining trend in all regimes for CCPI′, and
for CCPI, all regimes apart from 1821-1872, where the trend estimate is negative but
found to be insignificantly different from zero.
The vast majority of work has examined the PS hypothesis over the post-1900
period but we can now additionally comment on its relevance prior to the 20th century.
Strikingly, our results confirm that relative commodity prices present a significant and
downward global trend over almost the entire sample period. With the exception of
the 1821-1872 period, the growth rates of the commodity price indices were found
to decline in the ranges −0.79% to −1.38% per annum for CCPI, and −0.79% to
−1.42% per annum for CCPI′, over the different regimes. It is noticeable that the
broadly declining trend paths of the price series are punctuated by structural breaks
in the level and trend; 1820 shows a sharp rise in the level and trend, 1872/3 sees a
sharp fall in level and trend, while 1946 shows a rise in level18. This identification of
changing trend behaviour provides new characterisations of historical price behaviour –
for example, the 19th century terms of trade boom (see Williamson, 2008) is captured
by a local increase in prices during the second regime (i.e. early 1820s to the early
1870s), superimposed on a generic long-run downward trend. Moreover, the results
suggest that the decline in trend has been greater since the early 1870s than at any
time previous (albeit offset to some extent by an upward level shift in 1946). The
18Sumner (2009) notes that agricultural commodity prices rose sharply through World War II to
post-war spikes. Additonally, we acknowledge that if individual commodities have differing trends as
suggested by the work of Harvey et al. (2010) and others, reweighting could induce a break in trend
even where there are no breaks in the individual commodity series. We thank an anonymous referee
for this latter point.
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causes behind the modern incarnation of the PS hypothesis therefore appear arguably
stronger than those that existed in the more distant past – we shall return to this later.
4.2 Macroeconomic variables trend function analysis
The results of the trend and trend break tests for our macroeconomic series are shown
in Tables 4 and 5 respectively.19 Interestingly, UK GDP (plotted in Figure 6) shows a
significant and positive trend growth rate of 1.28% per annum over the 1650 to 1870
sample period. Moreover, a positive break in the trend in 1817, captures the UK’s
rising industrial production driven by technological advances in manufacturing and
growth, and closely matches the first break found in our CCPI series.
The US overtook the UK in terms of GDP in the 1870s (see Broadberry and Klein,
2011) and the rest of the industrial core also grew strongly over much of the 19th and
20th century. This is reflected in the growth of World GDP plotted in Figure 7 for
1820-2009. Table 4 shows the trend presents a growth rate of 2.23% per annum whilst
Table 5 shows breaks of a positive sign occur in the trend during the 1870s and 1950s.
Again, these breaks closely match those identified for earlier CCPI series. Overall, it
would appear that since the 1870s, increasing rates of trend economic growth in World
GDP are associated with declining trend rates in relative commodity prices. Both
trends may reflect a latent common factor such as increasing technological innovation.
Of course, since the mid-1990s and over most of the first decade of the 21st century,
commodity prices rose (see Figures 1 and 2). Academics (see, for example, Cuddington
and Jerrett, 2008) and commentators alike asked whether prices were in a positive
growth phase of a supercycle; a medium length cyclical movement with a periodicty
between 20 and 40 years. Explanations for higher prices include the rapid economic
growth delivered by China and other modernising developing economies, and therefore
19Given the shorter sample period available for the macroeconomic series, we set the maximal
number of breaks to two.
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Figure 8 plots the available Maddison GDP data for China from 1950 .20 Interestingly,
China’s path of trend growth broke positively around the late 1970s and has since shown
particularly high growth rates of 7.5% per annum. If this continued, real commodity
prices could remain supported above trend (similar to the mid-19th century) for a
number of years. However, recent price falls occurred during 2014 and are associated
with falling oil prices and concerns around the future economic growth of countries like
China.
Finally, before examining the relationship between commodity prices and macroe-
conomic variables, we note that the interest rate, as one might expect, presents no
trend.
4.3 Stationary VAR analysis
Recent work such as Erten and Ocampo (2013) has tested whether real commodity
prices and income are cointegrated. To assess whether this approach is appropriate,
we first test each series for a unit root. Table 6 presents results of ADF-type unit root
tests that account for the breaks in level/trend that we have previously determined.
Specifically, we conduct the additive outlier unit root t-tests of Perron (1989) (incor-
porating the Perron and Vogelsang (1993) correction), extended appropriately to the
multiple break case, with critical values obtained by simulation of the corresponding
limit distributions, conditioning on the number and timing of breaks in each case. The
lag order is determined using the Schwarz Information Criterion with a maximum of 12
lagged differences. We find evidence in favour of stationarity (around the broken trend
function) for all series except the interest rate. A cointegration approach is therefore
not appropriate, and we proceed to analyse the relationships between the variables
using a stationary VAR analysis, based on the de-trended commodity price and GDP
series, i.e. the residuals from estimation of (6), along with the first differences of the
20As the China series only contains 61 observations, we set the maximal number of breaks in this
series to one.
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interest rate. A stationary VAR(p) of the following form is estimated:
zt = v + A1zt−1 + ...+ Apzt−p + ut, t = 1, ..., T (7)
where zt = (z1t, ..., zkt)
′. Following Lu¨tkepohl (2005), lag lengths are chosen for pairs
of commodity price series21 and GDP, and where data are available, combinations of
commodity prices, GDP and interest rates, by comparing the results of a selection of
information criteria (IC)22. Table 7 shows the results of Granger causality tests, within
the different VAR frameworks. By way of explanation, consider Panel A which refers
to a VAR(1) of CCPI and a joint UK-World GDP series that covers the entirety of our
sample period. Here the p-value of 0.044 suggests that CCPI Granger causes GDP.
Taken as a whole, the other results in Table 7 confirm that commodity prices appear to
Granger cause income and interest rates, whilst interest rates23 tend to Granger cause
prices. Interestingly, these implications hold whether we examine combinations of our
composite commodity price index and US GDP or individual commodity price series
like copper, with GDP from commodity exporting economies like Chile.
Of course, we might expect shocks to composite commodity prices on US GDP, to
have a different affect to those shocks to copper prices on Chile GDP. Impulse response
functions, show this to be the case, with positive innovations to CCPI leading to a fall
in US GDP (see Figure 9), whilst a similar innovation to the copper price sees a rise
in Chile GDP (see Figure 10). It is notable that innovations to interest rates cause a
fall in commodity prices, whilst innovations to prices lead to a rise in interest rates no
matter what combination of prices and interest rate we observe.
21We only show results for CCPI in the multivariate analysis, as the results with CCPI′ are similar.
China is removed from this section of analysis as its GDP data are only available annually from 1950.
22Using a maximum lag length of 8 years, we use the Schwarz, Akaike and Hannan-Quinn Infor-
mation Criterion. When the ICs agree, that lag length is selected. When they disagree, the IC that
shows the most evidence of Granger causality is displayed
23Using consumer price level data from 1704 (see Hills et al., 2010), we also formed the real interest
rate. However, the constructed variable appears very variable until the second half of the 20th century.
Additionally, this variable did not appear at all related to either commodity prices or economic activity.
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5 Conclusions
Many developing countries present export earnings that are primary commodity depen-
dent. Therefore, the presence of a secular decline in primary commodity relative prices
as implied by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, suggests that unless developing countries
diversify into manufactures and/or services, they will incur long-run economic stagna-
tion. However, as Deaton and Laroque (2003) note, the literature has a relatively
limited understanding of both the causes of the long-run path in relative commodity
prices and any movements around that path. Given the recent availability of relevant
historical data, we suggest a very long-run approach to examine both issues.
First, we suggest that aggregating relative commodity prices over the very long-
run can smooth idiosyncratic effects and provide summary series shaped primarily by
common factors. To this end, this paper constructs new aggregate real commodity price
series from 1650 to 2014. The series are created by combining a new historical dataset
on the export values of 23 commodities, with the individual commodity price dataset
from Harvey et al. (2010). Subsequently, employing multiple break techniques robust
to whether or not each series contains a unit root, it is shown that the trend path of
these series can be partitioned into four regimes (i.e. 1650 to the early 1820s, the early
1820s to the early 1870s, the early 1870s to the mid-1940s, and the mid-1940s to 2014).
A long-run downward trend is estimated in all but the second regime, revealing that
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has relevance for the 17th, 18th and 20th centuries at
least. However, it is also shown that the series declined at a slower rate over the 17th
and 18th centuries as compared with the 20th century, suggesting that the economic
forces underlying the hypothesis intensified over this recent period.
Secondly, again employing multiple break techniques, we examine the time series
behaviour of several macroeconomic series over our long sample period. As might be
expected a number of breaks are found and in particular, it is shown that breaks in
the trend growth rate of the UK (1650 to 1870) and the World GDP (1820-2010) are
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dated analgously to those in the trend of commodity prices. This increasing rate of
trend growth in GDP as the sample increases, coupled with the decreasing rate of trend
growth for commodity prices, suggests a common latent factor such as technological in-
novation may be behind both. Certainly, inter alios, Sachs and McArthur (2002) stress
that technological innovation is a fundamental driver of long-run economic growth.
Thirdly, given recent work has suggested economic activity and interest rates are
related to commodity prices, we model the relationships between our long-run series.
As a precursor to this, the data are initially demeaned and detrended according to the
breaks found. Although income and commodity prices are often modelled as I(1) in
the literature, our residual series are typically found to be I(0) and therefore we adopt
stationary VAR approach. Strikingly, whether we assess large economy GDP like the
US with composite price indices or commodity exporting countries such as Chile and
the real price of its copper exports, there is evidence that commodity prices Granger
cause GDP and interest rates, whilst interest rates Granger cause commodity prices.
There would appear to be several lessons for the present day. For example, it would
appear likely, given our analysis, that the recent loose monetary policy supported higher
commodity prices. However, now that such prices are falling, policymakers should note
the historical asymmetric effect: a GDP boost for commodity importers but a fall for
commodity exporters. The recent slowdown in the growth of BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India, China) countries appears likely to continue whilst commodity prices remain low.
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6 Data Appendix
6.1 Commodity data sources
The weighted average commodity price indices are constructed using export values
from developing countries as weights, over the period 1830-2014. The sources used are
as follows:
1. 1830-1937. Principle source (for commodities Banana, Beef, Cocoa, Coffee, Cot-
ton, Hides, Jute, Oil, Pig Iron, Sugar, Tea, Tobacco, Wheat and Wool): Com-
modity Structure of Third World Exports 1830-1937, Paul Bairoch and Bouda
Etemad, Centre of International Economic History, University of Geneva.
2. 1830-1937. Secondary sources (for commodities Aluminum, Coal, Copper, Lamb,
Lead, Nickel, Rice, Tin and Zinc); imports to developed countries are used as a
proxy for exports from developing countries:
(a) US Geological Survey;
(b) Statistical Yearbook of Canada, 1899;
(c) Annuaire Statistique de la France, Vol. 19, 1899;
(d) Entwicklung und Strukturwandlungen des Englischen Außenhandels von
1700 bis zur Gegenwart, Werner Schlote, Probleme der Weltwirtschaft, Jena
Fischer, 1938;
(e) Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in Each of the Last Fifteen
Years from 1871 to 1885, HMSO, 1986.
3. 1938-2014. All data from 1962-2014 are obtained from the from the Comtrade
database, http://comtrade.un.org/data/. Trade weights between 1938 and 1961
are all linearly interpolated.
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6.2 Composite commodity price index construction
When constructing the CCPI, the following steps have been followed. First, the com-
modity price index (CPI) is calculated using
∑N
i=1witpit, where wit and pit respectively
represent the weight and price of the ith commodity in a particular year t. If prices
and weights are available for N − 1 commodities in the first t = 1, ..., x years and then
for N commodities in the next t = x + 1, ..., y years, individual CPI series are first
constructed for each period t = 1, ..., x + 1 and t = x + 1, ..., y using data on N − 1
and N commodities, respectively. Next, denote by wN−1i,x+1 and w
N
i,x+1 the weights em-







i,x+1pi,x+1, the aggregate series is created by multiplying the
ratio by the individual CPI values for the t = 1, ..., x period and splicing the individual
series together to assemble the CCPI.
Several benchmark years, namely 1830, 1860, 1900, 1912, 1928, 1937 and 1962
onwards are used to calculate the weights of commodities. Specifically, exports of
commodities from the commodity-dependent price-taking economies (the periphery24)
are used as weights. To be clear, the export value of the ith commodity is divided by
the total export value of all selected N commodities in year t to get the weight, wit,
of the ith commodity in year t. The periphery consists of Asia (excluding Russia),
Africa and South America. The benchmark dates are predominantly dictated by data
availability; in particular, data on commodity exports are not available before 1830
on a world scale and it is doubtful that the scant import data that are available for a
couple of industrialized countries before 1830 are representative of commodity exports
for the periphery. In terms of composition of traded commodities there has been a
marked change over time. Sugar, textile fibres, coffee, tea and cocoa were the main
export items in 1830 and came predominantly from Asia and South America. Of course,
24Blattman et al. (2007) adopts the distinction between the periphery and the core (industrial
leaders).
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energy and metals have recently become the dominant commodities in world trade.
The benchmark years are subsequently linearly interpolated to get weighted series
for each commodity on an annual basis. Specifically, interpolation is applied between
the benchmark years from 1830 to 1962; to complete the series, 1830 weights are used
before 1830 and annual weights are used after 1962 until 2014. Although weights before
1830 are kept constant due to unavailability of data, the weights of commodities have
been calculated such that their sum remains 100 in each year. For years where price
data are unavailable for a few commodities, weights for those commodities in those
years are set to zero under the assumption that a commodity has no value or weight
when the price is zero. This leads to the construction of the CCPI covering a 365 year
period from 1650 to 2014.
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Figure 1. Logarithms of CCPI and CCPI′, 1650-2014: CCPI, · · · CCPI′
Figure 2. Logarithms of CCPI, CCPI′ and GYCPI, 1900-2008: CCPI, · · · CCPI′, - - - GYCPI
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Figure 3. Logarithms of HPIM and MUV deflators, 1900-2008: HPIM, · · · MUV
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Figure 4. Logarithms of CCPI and fitted broken trend, 1650-2014: CCPI, - - - fitted values
Figure 5. Logarithms of CCPI′ and fitted broken trend, 1650-2014: CCPI′, - - - fitted values
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Figure 6. Logarithms of UK GDP and fitted broken trend, 1650-1870: GDP, - - - fitted values
Figure 7. Logarithms of World GDP and fitted broken trend, 1820-2009: GDP, - - - fitted values
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Figure 10. Response of Chile GDP to Cholesky 1 s.d Copper innovation
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Table 1. Tests for a negative trend and estimated growth rates.
Panel A. 1650-2014
tRQFβ (MU ) Growth Rate (%) 90% c.i. 95% c.i. 99% c.i.
CCPI −17.45*** −0.88 −0.96,−0.80 −0.98,−0.78 −1.01,−0.75
CCPI′ −17.06*** −0.84 −0.92,−0.76 −0.94,−0.74 −0.97,−0.71
Panel B. 1900-2008
tRQFβ (MU ) Growth Rate (%) 90% c.i. 95% c.i. 99% c.i.
CCPI −0.25 −0.32 −2.40, +1.77 −2.79, +2.16 −3.56, +2.93
CCPI′ −0.37 −0.35 −1.87, +1.18 −2.16, +1.47 −2.73, +2.03
GYCPI −4.08*** −0.58 −0.81,−0.34 −0.85,−0.30 −0.94,−0.21
Note: *** denotes rejection at the 1% significance level.
Table 2. Sequential tests for multiple breaks in level/trend.
CCPI CCPI′
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s) FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 9.17*** 1881 8.88*** 1882
FT (2 |1) 9.51*** 1823, 1946 8.81*** 1823, 1946
FT (3 |2) 15.71*** 1820, 1872, 1946 15.64*** 1820, 1873, 1946
Note: *** denotes rejection at the 1% significance level.
Table 3. Tests for a negative trend in sub-sample regimes.
CCPI CCPI′
1650-1820 H0 : β = 0 −11.14*** −12.79***
1821-1872/3 H0 : β + γ1 = 0 −1.21 −2.02**
1873/4-1946 H0 : β + γ1 + γ2 = 0 −5.17*** −5.40***
1947-2014 H0 : β + γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 0 −2.31** −3.30***
Note: ** and *** denote rejection at the 5% and 1% significance
levels respectively.
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Table 4. Tests for a trend and estimated growth rates.
tRQFβ (MU ) Growth Rate (%) 90% c.i. 95% c.i. 99% c.i.
UK GDP (1650-1870) 4.65*** 1.28 0.83, 1.74 0.74, 1.82 0.57, 1.99
World GDP (1820-2009) 5.44*** 2.23 1.56, 2.91 1.43, 3.04 1.18, 3.29
USA GDP (1820-2009) 15.35*** 3.45 3.08, 3.82 3.01, 3.89 2.87, 4.03
Chile GDP (1870-2009) 6.43*** 3.22 2.39, 4.04 2.24, 4.20 1.93, 4.50
China GDP (1950-2009) 9.26*** 6.24 5.13, 7.35 4.92, 7.56 4.51, 7.96
Interest rate (1703-2009) −0.18 0.00 −0.93, 0.75 −1.09, 0.91 −1.40, 1.22
Note: *** denotes rejection at the 1% significance level.
Table 5. Sequential tests for multiple breaks in level/trend.
UK (1650-1870)
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 31.04*** 1790
FT (2 |1) 69.10*** 1773, 1817
World (1820-2009)
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 15.13*** 1933
FT (2 |1) 23.73*** 1872, 1955
USA (1820-2009)
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 11.53*** 1913
FT (2 |1) 8.45*** 1930, 1945
Chile (1870-2009)
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 3.70** 1930
China (1950-2009)
FT (l + 1 |l ) Estimated break date(s)
FT (1 |0) 12.07*** 1976
Note: ** and *** denote rejection at the 5% and 1% significance level.
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UK GDP (1650-1870) −7.75***
UK-World GDP (1650-2009) −5.10**
World GDP (1820-2009) −6.03***
USA GDP (1820-2009) −4.39**
Chile GDP (1870-2009) −4.13**
Interest rate (1703-2009) −2.06
Note: *,** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels respectively. The UK-World GDP series is an index of UK
GDP until 1869 and then World GDP thereafter.
36
Table 7. VAR Granger causality tests.
Panel A. CCPI and UK-World GDP (1650-2009)
pt yt rt All Lag length
pt - 0.900 - 0.900 1
yt 0.044 - - 0.044
rt - - - -
Panel B. CCPI, UK-World GDP, Interest Rates (1703-2009)
pt yt rt All Lag length
pt - 0.171 0.107 0.093 1
yt 0.113 - 0.741 0.274
rt 0.349 0.373 - 0.386
Panel C. CCPI and USA GDP (1820-2009)
pt yt rt All Lag length
pt - 0.683 - 0.683 1
yt 0.027 - - 0.027
rt - - - -
Panel D. CCPI, USA GDP and Interest Rates (1820-2009)
pt yt rt All Lag length
pt - 0.900 0.064 0.170 1
yt 0.045 - 0.152 0.028
rt 0.041 0.931 - 0.123
Panel E. Copper and Chile GDP (1870-2009)
pt yt rt All Lag length
pt - 0.293 - 0.293 2
yt 0.026 - - 0.026
rt - - - -
Panel E. Copper, Chile GDP and Interest Rates (1870-2009)
pt yt rt All Lag length
pt - 0.180 0.027 0.045 2
yt 0.035 - 0.119 0.021
rt 0.015 0.005 - 0.001
Note: Variables listed vertically are dependent, whilst those
listed horizontally are potentially causal. Tabulated numbers
are p-values.
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